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      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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     UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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                                              17 Cr. 477 (PAE)
                 V.
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     JASON NISSEN,
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                    Defendant.
                                              Sentence
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 8
                                              New York, N.Y.
                                              September 6, 2019
9
                                              9:30 a.m.
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     Before:
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                         HON. PAUL A. ENGELMAYER,
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                                              District Judge
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                                APPEARANCES
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      GEOFFREY S. BERMAN
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          United States Attorney for the
           Southern District of New York
     BY: DOUGLAS S. ZOLKIND
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          LARA E. POMERANTZ
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          Assistant United States Attorneys
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     MICHAEL F. BACHNER
     HOWARD S. WEINER
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          Attorneys for Defendant
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     Also Present: Special Agent Lauren Calvello, FBI
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(Case called)

MR. ZOLKIND: Good morning, your Honor. Douglas
Zolkind and Lara Pomerantz, for the government. We're joined
at counsel table by Lauren Calvello of the FBI.

Also, behind us, your Honor, are two representatives of Kroll in case the Court has any questions regarding Kroll's analysis.

THE COURT: OK. Very good. Thank you.

Good morning, Mr. Zolkind.

Good morning, Ms. Pomerantz.

Good morning, Agent Calvello.

And thank you in advance to the Kroll representatives for the work that they performed, and I appreciate your being here today.

I don't offhand think it likely that I'll need to inquire of them, but I appreciate, counsel, you making them available.

For the defense.

MR. BACHNER: Good morning, your Honor. Michael
Bachner and Howard Weiner of my office on behalf of Jason
Nissen, your Honor. Mr. Nissen is, obviously, standing to my
right.

THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Bachner.

Good morning, Mr. Weiner.

And of course, good morning to you, Mr. Nissen.

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1 THE DEFENDANT: Good morning, your Honor. THE COURT: Good morning as well to the members of the 2 3 public who are here today. 4 Let me just ask you, Mr. Bachner, whether any of the 5 people who are here are friends or family of your client. 6 MR. BACHNER: Yes, your Honor. 7 THE COURT: All right. Can you point them out. MR. BACHNER: I only know some. I know many of them 8 9 are Mr. Nissen's fraternity members and people he's done 10 business with. 11 Haydee Nissen, his wife, is in the first row, and I 12 think these are family members of Haydee's. 13 THE COURT: OK. 14 Welcome. Thank you for being here. I appreciate your 15 presence. 16 Government, are there any representatives of the 17 victims who are here today? MR. BACHNER: Your Honor, I'm not sure. We've been in 18 close contact with the office of the victim witness 19 20 coordinator, and we know that the victims have all been 21 notified today and are aware. Whether any are here today, we 2.2 have no control. 23 THE COURT: All right. 24 Let me just ask to see a show of hands. Is there

anybody here who is either a victim or a representative of one

of the victims in this case?

All right. You are, sir? Just keep your voice up.

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MR. RAPS: My name is Paul Raps, and I'm representing Taly.

THE COURT: And you represent?

MR. RAPS: Taly.

THE COURT: Taly. All right. Very good.

Any other hands?

All right. Good morning, Mr. Raps, and thank you for being here today.

All right. We're here today to resume and complete the sentencing hearing for defendant Jason Nissen that began on September 21 of last year. At that initial hearing, the Court took up a number of preliminary matters relating to sentencing. I incorporate by reference here all that was said and accomplished at that proceeding for those matters.

For the benefit of those present today who weren't at the initial hearing, I want to briefly recap what was covered then.

First of all, I made a record of the materials, voluminous materials, that had been submitted as of that date in connection with this sentencing.

Second, I confirmed that all parties had received the presentence report, and I gave the parties an opportunity to

make factual objections to the presentence report. For the most part, the parties did not object to the PSR, although there is one small, discrete outstanding factual item regarding the PSR that I will take up shortly that is not of any apparent consequence.

Third, I confirmed that all the parties agreed with the probation department's calculation on the advisory sentencing guidelines range. Specifically, the guidelines as calculated by the probation department recommend a sentence of between 97 and 121 months in prison based on an adjusted offense level of 30 and a criminal history category of I. The Court found that that is, in fact, the correct calculation of the advisory guidelines.

Finally, I had an extended discussion with counsel about an opening potential issue of potential considerable importance, and that is what became of the more than \$70 million that were the fruits of the fraud to which Mr. Nissen has pled guilty. The presentence report has made a reference or two to Mr. Nissen's having acted, in part, "to enrich himself." One of the victims in this case, the lender Taly USA Holdings, had written a letter to the Court which posited that \$10 million obtained by Mr. Nissen was missing and had been stashed away for Mr. Nissen's future use, perhaps, on a Caribbean island.

The government furnished the Court with that letter

without suggesting that it had any doubts about that factual representation, and so the Court took up the issue with counsel. It became apparent that the government and its case agents, due to the way the case had come in, had not investigated independently what had become of the fruits of the fraud. And it also became clear that that there had not really been any systematic investigation into that, although it was the case that Mr. Nissen, through his counsel, denied using the fruits of the fraud for his personal benefit.

At the September 21, 2018, hearing, I tasked government counsel, ultimately, with reconstructing factually what had become of the more than \$70 million and specifically whether, if so, to what extent Mr. Nissen had received any personal financial benefit from the fraud. Ultimately, the investigative firm, Kroll, which has been assisting in Mr. Nissen's related bankruptcy proceedings, took on that assignment, supervised effectively by counsel from both sides.

With that preface, let me recap what has happened in the almost one year since the initial hearing. Since then I've received the following materials.

I've received a series of status letters from the government and the defense as to the Kroll investigative work that was being undertaken. These included letters dated November 2 and December 17 of 2018 and February 15, April 15 and June 13, 2019. And I've received a letter from the

defense, dated July 11, asking for a final adjournment of the deadline I had set to submit findings to the Court.

All of this culminated in a joint letter I received, dated July 29, 2019, which set out both Kroll's findings and the parties' perspectives on it. The letter is docketed at Dkt. 71. I'm not going to purport to summarize it all here. Kroll's central findings were that the accusation that there was \$10 million of missing or hidden funds was factually wrong. Kroll, to a very detailed extent, was able to trace the funds and found that 94 percent of the aggregate dollar amount of the defendant's disbursements were most likely business-related; that approximately \$564,349, comprised of about 400 transactions, were, to a high degree of confidence, personal in nature; and that approximately \$483,670 relating to the Mandalay Bay casino were likely personal expenditures; and therefore a total of about \$1,040,000 were likely personal in nature.

The letter also set out the defense's view that these sums should be viewed as offset by \$60,000 that had been paid to NECO employees and \$150,170 paid by pre-Falcon funds. The letter also set out the defense's view that the personal expenditures should be viewed as also offset by loans made to the company and salary payments that Mr. Nissen was entitled to but did not take.

On July 30, 2019, I issued an order, docketed at Dkt.

72, stating my view, based on my review of that letter, that although the parties differ about the significance and meaning of certain matters, such as Mr. Nissen's not having taken his full authorized salary, there did not appear to be any further disputes of fact, and therefore, I scheduled sentencing today.

That's the recap of what brought us to this place.

Before I invite each side to be heard with respect to sentencing, there are a couple of housekeeping matters I need to take up.

To begin with, other than the submissions that I listed at the initial sentencing proceeding that I just listed, has anything else been submitted in connection with this sentencing?

MR. ZOLKIND: Your Honor, this morning we submitted a consent order of forfeiture and a proposed order of restitution.

THE COURT: Right. And the consent order of forfeiture is identical to the one I referred to last year save that it freshens up the date.

MR. ZOLKIND: Exactly right.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. ZOLKIND: Your Honor, could I offer one minor point of clarification to something the Court just said?

I think the Court said that Kroll's work was effectively supervised by both the government and the defense.

I just want to be very clear. Kroll's work was supervised by the government. Certainly they received input and met with the defense, but I just want to be clear that they were under the supervision of the government.

THE COURT: OK. Thank you. I think that's a more helpful way of putting it. What I really meant to capture, but you put it better, was that the defense was actively consulted in the process to make sure that nothing was missed.

Do I have that right?

MR. ZOLKIND: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Bachner, anything else besides what I have listed?

MR. BACHNER: Your Honor, just to make sure, the November 19, 2018, letter we submitted to the Court, which was an upgraded diagnostic evaluation of Mr. Nissen's youngest daughter, Elisabeth.

THE COURT: Yes. Thank you. I appreciate that. You're right; I forgot to --

MR. BACHNER: No problem, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- mention that, I think because it was not on the public docket.

MR. BACHNER: Correct.

THE COURT: OK.

Second of all, at the last hearing, September of last year, there was one small unresolved issue from paragraph 110

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J96WnisS of the presentence report. It had stated that the defendant had not yet filed his 2015 to 2017 tax returns. Footnote 1 of the July 29 joint letter reports that those returns have now, in fact, been filed. Is that correct? MR. BACHNER: Yes, Judge. THE COURT: Government, do you agree? MR. ZOLKIND: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Then I will amend paragraph 110 to reflect that, in fact, the returns have been filed. Third, and finally, am I correct that with all of the ground I've covered, there are no longer any factual disputes arising out of the work that Kroll did analyzing the

defendant's expenditures?

MR. ZOLKIND: We agree, your Honor, that there is no material dispute of fact.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. BACHNER: Agreed, your Honor.

THE COURT: Very well.

And again, I understand that the parties take differing views as to the meaning of certain events, but the events themselves appear to be undisputed.

Having taken care of all those necessary preliminaries, we now come to the heart of the matter, which is the parties' views with respect to sentencing.

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Government, I'd like to ask you to speak first, but just as a preface, apart from the two victim letters that I've received, I just want to pursue something we covered long ago. You have given notice to the victims of this proceeding. MR. ZOLKIND: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: And do you know if any victims seek to speak here today? MR. ZOLKIND: We have not been informed of any victims wishing to speak. THE COURT: All right. Let me ask Mr. Raps, who is the one victim representative who is here. You have not indicated an interest in speaking for your client. Although I have received your letter, I'm extending you the opportunity. Is that something you wish to do today? MR. RAPS: No. THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Since a couple of people have come in since the proceeding began, has any other representative of a victim appeared today? OK. Very good. Government, I'd be happy to hear from you.

MR. ZOLKIND: Thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor, the government will, I think, primarily rely on the sentencing submission that we provided to the Court in advance of the originally scheduled date, but let me add a

few additional points and factors of mitigation.

It is our view, your Honor, and continues to be adamantly the government's view, after the Kroll analysis, that the defendant perpetrated an extremely serious fraud. Real victims, real people lost more than \$70 million because they were duped by the defendant's lies. And the government submits that the conduct here calls for a meaningful sentence.

Let me just talk a little bit about the offense conduct, and I do think it is important to acknowledge that, from our understanding, it appears that the defendant started his business with what, from all appearances, seems to be pure enough intentions. This doesn't seem to be the kind of case where the defendant set out from the outset to perpetrate fraud. At least that's not what our investigation has indicated.

THE COURT: Well, you're using the word "seems." I mean, it seems to me undisputed that that's the case; that this was a legitimate business that got into trouble, he made the wrong call and turned it into a fraud.

MR. ZOLKIND: Exactly.

I'm simply acknowledging something of a mitigating factor. It appears that he set out, we don't dispute he set out, to run a legitimate business.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ZOLKIND: But at some point around 2015 or a

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little earlier, the company was running into financial problems. He didn't have enough capital to pay his debts, and the defendant was faced with a choice. And again, I think it's critical to recognize that he had a choice.

He's a sophisticated businessperson. He could have dealt with his financial predicament responsibly. He could have tried to refinance the loans or filed for bankruptcy or done any other number of things, but he made the decision to cheat and lie. He wasn't pressured into it. He wasn't acting out of some mistake. That was his decision, and so he approached new lenders, one of whom, Falcon, loaned more than \$40 million to him ultimately. And in often cases he went to people that knew him, people that trusted him. And he hid from those people -- those lenders, investors -- information that was highly material. So, perhaps most material, he hid the extent to which he was already indebted to other lenders. And so at that point the scheme became essentially a Ponzi scheme, where he was taking in money from new lenders and using that money in the main to repay other lenders rather than using it to run his business.

THE COURT: There was a small amount of the money that was explicitly earmarked for old lenders, but that turned out to be a fraction of the money that was, in fact, used to pay old debts.

MR. ZOLKIND: That's right, your Honor. And just as

true some of the money that came in from the new lenders was used to buy tickets and run the business but not nearly to the extent that was represented.

He also falsely inflated his company's sales data to make it appear that the company was thriving when the exact opposite was true. In certain cases he used programs like Photoshop to falsify financial statements. He went to significant lengths to hide this fraud from everyone else in his company, including the CFO. And so, I think we've seen in some of what the defense has said the suggestion that he was running a legitimate business during this period, and we vigorously disagree with that characterization.

Among other things, Kroll's investigation confirmed that the defendant's recordkeeping was egregious; that there was really no effort made to segregate personal expenditures from business expenditures.

One example of how the business was run is that —
there's an individual, Jona Rechnitz, who's been a government
cooperator in other cases; that person helped to bring in
investors to the defendant's business, and the defendant
compensated Rechnitz, in large part, by paying off his American
Express for the purpose, as we understand it, to disguise the
fact of those payments and to try to avoid income taxes.

THE COURT: Avoid income tax payments by Rechnitz.

MR. ZOLKIND: That's right.

25 MR. ZOLKIND: That's right

was run.

THE COURT: He was facilitating Rechnitz's evasion.

MR. ZOLKIND: That's correct.

THE COURT: I don't think that's in the PSR. You're not asking me to treat as any an aggravating fact any aiding and abetting of a Rechnitz tax scheme, right?

MR. ZOLKIND: We're not, your Honor. I'm just pointing it out as part of the description of how the business

THE COURT: Understood.

MR. ZOLKIND: Now, I do want to acknowledge another mitigating factor, which is not insignificant, that the defendant of his own accord, came in, met with the government and disclosed virtually the full extent of his fraud. That is not common — it doesn't happen — and saved the government considerable resources, and it deserves recognition.

I think it is also certainly fair to say that the business was crumbling at that point and highly likely that this all would've been --

THE COURT: Disclosure was inevitable; it was just a matter of time.

MR. ZOLKIND: I think that's right. There was really no question.

It is also not insignificant that, as Kroll found, this was not a case like, say, Bernie Madoff or something like that, who was running a Ponzi scheme, hiding the assets

offshore, funding an exorbitant lifestyle. He was using the money in part for his own personal benefit, but that doesn't seem to have been the main driver here.

THE COURT: Mr. Bachner's point is right, isn't it, that if the point of this was personal enrichment, there was low-hanging fruit that he didn't take, like the authorized salary he didn't take.

MR. ZOLKIND: That's right.

THE COURT: So, while it's true that the sloppy nature of the rest of the business led him to pay in its entirety

American Express bills that only partly subsumed business as opposed to personal costs, it's also the case that he left some personal compensation untapped.

MR. ZOLKIND: That's right. I mean, clearly he was trying to make his business bigger and more profitable, which would have ultimately inured to his significant personal benefit if it had worked, but he couldn't sustain the scheme, as is often the case with Ponzi schemes.

Your Honor, I guess I would close, if I could, just by referring to some of the statements made by the victims, because I think they help to reinforce that even though the money in this case came from hedge funds and entities that are often perceived as having unlimited net worths, or close thereto, at its heart, there were real people that were harmed by this.

As the principal of Taly USA Holdings put it, he said:
"This is not a victimless crime. Futures have been destroyed.

Life savings have been depleted." He went on to say that while his companies may sound like faceless corporate entities, they're not. They are companies of people who rely on them for their livelihoods.

If I could quote just one more victim?

THE COURT: Of course.

MR. ZOLKIND: Dean Landis Credit Cash said, and I quote: "My family and I were, and continue to be, severely impacted by this crime. I own and manage a relatively small business. The financial loss has been devastating. Upon realizing that I'd been defrauded and would perhaps lose millions of dollars, I was crushed. The immediate shock that and toll on me was worse than any feeling I had ever had. I was worried for my business's survival, my family's well-being and my employees' confidence that we could withstand such a catastrophe."

For all these reasons, the government recommends a sentence within the guidelines.

THE COURT: Let me follow up just on a few things, but just as a matter of housekeeping, we have the consent preliminary order of forfeiture, which you have given me with the new dates, and I'll check in a moment with the defense, but I intend to sign that.

You've also given me, though, an order of restitution which does not quite track with what the presentence report recommends.

MR. ZOLKIND: Yes.

THE COURT: I have not checked whether the numbers match. Let me begin with that. Do the numbers match what's in the presentence report?

MR. ZOLKIND: I can explain that, your Honor.

The order of restitution we provided to the Court matches the amount in the forfeiture order. It is, I think, \$150,000 less than the amount in the PSR, and that is because subsequent to providing information to the probation office that they then incorporated into the PSR, we determined, in discussions with defense counsel and with counsel to Falcon, that in our calculations we had added \$150,000 to Falcon's loss that was not correct. They've agreed that that was not correct, and the defense and the government are in accord.

THE COURT: All right. So, the figures in the schedule of victims attached to the proposed restitution order are correct, and those supersede those in the presentence report.

MR. ZOLKIND: That's correct.

THE COURT: All right.

The presentence report has a familiar provision under which the defendant is to pay a portion of his income over time

towards unpaid restitution. The order of restitution you have given me, which is quite brief, contains the following arresting statement:

"The defendant sham complete restitution payments within 90 days of the entry of this order."

It says nothing about any obligation as to unpaid restitution. What does that sentence mean? You're not representing that the defendant has even a fraction of the restitution amount in hand or coming to him in 90 days. What does that sentence mean?

MR. ZOLKIND: You're absolutely right, your Honor. I apologize for that.

THE COURT: That just seems derived from some other case.

MR. ZOLKIND: It must be, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ZOLKIND: My apologies.

THE COURT: No worries. I'm just trying to make this workable.

Let me put out the following, which is, under the law, the Court can give counsel an extension of time after a sentencing to submit a restitution order. Subject to what I hear from the defense, it's my expectation that I would want to order restitution with the same numbers that you have but that contains a provision akin to that in the presentence report

that embeds an ongoing obligation reflected as a portion of income for Mr. Nissen to be paying restitution, and beyond that, I would be making the order of restitution a condition of supervised release. And I expect that the formation of the supervised release term, on the likely assumption that restitution remains then outstanding, that the U.S. Attorney's Office victim unit would convert that supervised release term into a consent judgment so that the victims can continue to pursue the restitution from Mr. Nissen even after supervised release is done.

Isn't that the right way to proceed here?

MR. ZOLKIND: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. How much time do you think before it would take to conform the order of restitution essentially to terms along those lines?

MR. ZOLKIND: Would one week be acceptable?

THE COURT: More than acceptable. That's quite fast. That's fine. We'll come back to that at the end of sentencing, but the important thing is that the numbers here are correct. But I think the actual text is going to need some work.

MR. ZOLKIND: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

The final question really involves the last thing you said. At the beginning of your remarks, you said you wanted a meaningful sentence. At the end, you were phrasing something

that was said in the sentencing letter of more than a year ago. The government asked for a sentence within the guideline range. Is it the government's view that there's no sentence below 97 months that could reasonably take into account the 3553(a) factors?

MR. ZOLKIND: Your Honor, the way we've approached it is that we look at the amount of the fraud, the way it was perpetrated, and we think that those factors solidly call for a guidelines sentence. And then we've looked at whether the mitigation is such that it would take this case out of our ordinary practice of recommending a guidelines sentence.

THE COURT: Your view is that that justifies -- that would make a sentence of anything less than 97 months unreasonable.

MR. ZOLKIND: Your Honor, I won't say that we think a sentence below 97 months would be unreasonable. I think there's a range of sentences that could be reasonable in this case.

THE COURT: I agree with that. Under the parsimony principle, the Court has to choose the lowest of the reasonable sentences, and that's why, while I appreciate your advocacy that a guidelines is among the reasonable outcomes here --

MR. ZOLKIND: Yes.

THE COURT: -- the question for me is not that; it's what the lowest of the reasonable sentences is, and so I'm

putting it to you. Is it really the government's view that no sentence below the guideline range would reasonably take into account the 3553(a) factors?

MR. ZOLKIND: Your Honor, I would not say this is the kind of case where our position is that no sentence dipping below 97 months could be reasonable. And so I think, in our view, a guidelines sentence is reasonable in this case, but we do recognize that there are mitigating factors that distinguish this case from other, significant frauds, so we certainly acknowledge that and recognize that a sentence below 97 months could be reasonable.

THE COURT: Does the government have a fear when Mr. Nissen is at liberty again of his committing another crime? Is that a realistic consideration here?

MR. ZOLKIND: Sure. I think so.

THE COURT: Why?

MR. ZOLKIND: Well, he doesn't have a significant criminal history.

THE COURT: He doesn't have a criminal history.

MR. ZOLKIND: He doesn't, correct.

So, this is not a case where someone has been committing frauds all their adult life, but at the same time, it was a serious fraud. It was not a rash decision. It was the kind of thing done over time in a very deliberate manner, and so I think there is reason to be hopeful that he has

learned his lesson, and certainly the fact that he brought it to the government's attention is reason to be optimistic in that regard. And I think a sentence of imprisonment would help certainly to reinforce that deterrent, so I think there's certainly reason to be hopeful that he won't return to committing this type of fraud again. But do I think it is something that — the need for deterrence is something that should factor into the Court's sentencing decision?

Absolutely.

THE COURT: OK. Thank you very much. All right. Very helpful.

Mr. Bachner, before I ask more systematically for your views, let me take care of some of the loose ends. You consent to the order of forfeiture, correct?

MR. BACHNER: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

As to restitution, you're in agreement with the numbers that the government now proposes.

MR. BACHNER: We are in agreement.

This is something to work out later. As I understand it, there were moneys that have been recovered by the trustee in bankruptcy in the estate, so that number ultimately will be — the obligation ultimately from Mr. Nissen will be lower, but that is the amount of the restitution.

THE COURT: Let me put it this way. For the purposes

of the restitution order, do you agree with the numbers the government has now proposed?

MR. BACHNER: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: Understanding that some of the sequelae from the bankruptcy may result in payments that are applied to those numbers.

MR. BACHNER: Correct.

THE COURT: That's what you're saying.

MR. BACHNER: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Any reason why, then, I shouldn't give the government a short period of time to modify the restitution order to embed an ongoing payment obligation by Mr. Nissen?

MR. BACHNER: We're in full agreement with that, Judge.

THE COURT: Do you have any sense right now of what money, including through the bankruptcy, is, in practice, going to be available? I mean, what is it that can be collected through the bankruptcy process that ultimately, net of bankruptcy relevant costs, is likely to be available for the victims?

MR. BACHNER: Judge, I've heard the number of about 5 million bandied around, but I don't know that for a fact.

THE COURT: OK. All right. Thank you very much. Having taken care of then just restitution and

forfeiture, anything you want to say on those subjects?

MR. BACHNER: No, Judge.

THE COURT: I'm happy to hear from you more broadly then.

MR. BACHNER: Thank you, your Honor.

Judge, first of all, we want to thank the Court for the one-year delay that you suggested and ordered in this case, because I think it's indicative of the attention that your Honor -- I don't mean to be -- but it's just how I feel, that this is indicative of the attention that your Honor has given to the case and the significance, I think, your Honor, we hope, will be implying in the motives Mr. Nissen had in committing what is clearly a serious crime.

Judge, I've been doing this -- sometimes I hate to admit it, because it's hard to believe; it's been about 35 years as a defense lawyer and four years prior to that as a prosecutor, and in all the years I've been doing this, it never ceases to amaze me that the hardest part of my job is doing what I'm doing now, but I would never switch places with a judge, in a heartbeat. I couldn't do it. The need and the purpose of sentencing a defendant is such a monumental task, and I know that is why your Honor has done what you've done, delaying the sentence for as long as you need to get all of the facts, to make the right decision.

In my representation, I know in front the courts you

see a lot of bad folks who come in front of you who have done a lot of bad things in the past and sometimes have done bad things for the first time, but there's really serious indications that these people are oftentimes people who have made often a lot of very bad choices and have sometimes earned the title of being kind of bad people, either through their criminal history category, etc.

And sometimes people come in front of you who are people who have done things seriously wrong really for the first time in their lives after living a pretty good life and indicating that they're not bad people, but they made very serious misjudgments, very serious choices that were bad, as Mr. Zolkind indicated, and Mr. Nissen made a very bad choice. And my request of this Court is that that bad choice not color who Mr. Nissen really is.

Mr. Nissen, Judge, is, frankly, as the letters we've submitted to the Court, a very good man, who has indicated through his life a philanthropic, altruistic tendency in his life, and that's why when your Honor asked Mr. Zolkind whether he believed Mr. Nissen could commit crimes like this again in the future, I mean, I know sometimes — and I have enormous respect for both prosecutors in this case; they've been fair, judicious, and they've worked with the defense and they should be commended for that, your Honor. But sometimes prosecutors, and I may have done this myself when I was one, act

reflexively.

There's really no reason to think, statistically or otherwise, that Mr. Nissen will ever commit a crime like this again. We know statistically that white collar defendants, like Mr. Nissen, in his age group, his marital status, his lack of criminal record, I think the recidivism level is less than 4 percent. So, if even from a statistical level it's unlikely he would do it, but certainly from his unique humanity and characteristics of who this person is, I think the chances of him doing this are remarkably lower than that. I wouldn't be disingenuous with the Court and ever rule anything out, because nobody can do that. But I think your Honor should be comfortable that from a specific-deterrence point of view, Mr. Nissen is going to be in front of this judge or any judge again. I think that's a good bet. Nothing's perfect, but I think it's a good bet.

Your Honor, the first criteria that a judge, under 3553(a), should be considering is the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and the characteristics of the defendant.

To me, your Honor, I don't think it's any accident that that is the singular, only criteria under 3553(a) that is in the conjunctive; that is, a Court's obligated to look at the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant. And that is because no

judge, under the guidelines or under 3553(a), should be looking only at the crime and then at the defendant. They have to be looked at together. What instigated this? What were the motives? What type of person was involved in this offense? And that I believe, is why it's in the conjunctive.

Judge, you've probably had the Honorable Judge Rakoff thrown at you many times in sentencing memorandums, as he should be, because he's one of the most admirable judges on the bench, but I think the words that he used in one case are just worth repeating. He said:

"Surely, if ever a man is to receive credit for the good he has done, and his immediate misconduct assessed in the context of his overall life hitherto, it should be at the moment of his sentencing, when his very future hangs in the balance. This elementary principle of weighing the good with the bad, which is basic to all the great religions, moral philosophies and systems of justice was plainly what Congress had in mind when it directed courts to consider, as a necessary sentencing factor, 'the history and characteristics of the defendant.'"

It's such a beautifully stated purpose of what sentencing is, in deciding an appropriate sentence. And then the Supreme Court said it a year later when they said that in sentencing a defendant a court must consider the fact that it is a "unique study in the human failings that sometimes

mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue."

To me, Judge, and you said it to Mr. Zolkind, the overarching principle of what is a fair and reasonable sentence in any criminal case is the parsimony clause, and that is what is the lowest sentence a court can impose that is sufficient, not greater than necessary, to meet the goals of sentencing? It's not the highest sentence, because for that it would be for life. It's what is the lowest sentence, because, frankly, Judge, and I'll talk about this a little bit later.

I was at a conference, and we had a fellow, who ended up on 60 Minutes, like, a month ago, who robbed a few banks when he was a young guy. Then he became a lawyer, remarkably. He clerked for a federal judge, and he became one of the great sentencing mavens we have; he goes around the country. And he was giving a bunch of lawyers and judges these statistics.

The United States of America represents 5 percent of the world's population. We represent 25 percent of the incarcerated population. There are 113 million Americans who either know or have a friend or relative who was or is in jail, and we have almost 3 million Americans presently incarcerated.

The bottom line, Judge, is we sentence people a lot more than any other country for longer periods of time than any other country, and our crime is no better. We punish a lot and we warehouse people a lot. We just do, and I'm not here to

judge right or wrong, but these are just statistically the facts. And I'm going to get to this, Judge, but the question for your Honor is, under the goals of sentencing, what is the right sentence for punishment?

He knows he's going to jail, and frankly, he should be going to jail for a period of time for what he's done. The question is when does punishment — the appropriate punishment, Otop and when does warehousing begin? When are we just putting him away for a purpose other than appropriately punishing him for what he has done?

Your Honor, Mr. Nissen understands, and he's written to the Court, that his conduct was just monumentally wrong, and the victims who wrote to this Court — it's easy for us to say how remorseful Mr. Nissen is, but he is. He had a reputation of trying to be honest and live a life of integrity in this business, and it's been shattered. He feels horrible for what he's done, and in order to rectify that, what he tried to do, and what he did do, is affirmatively go out, before there was an investigation — and we can quibble about whether something was going to happen, not happen, but Judge, you've been a long time, and I have, 99 percent of the people wait for it to happen. They don't go in there and call the U.S. Attorney's Office up, as we did, when there was just a problem.

And Mr. Nissen, Judge, he could have fought this case. He could have filed motions. He could have had hearings. He

could have put the victims on the stand. He could've done a lot of things, and maybe we could have made some mash-up. Who knows? But that was never the game plan. The game plan was "I screwed up here, this is bad, call the U.S. Attorney's Office," and I immediately did it, at his direction, not my advice, at his direction. When we went in there, he proffered. He told them exactly what he did. He went through the records with them, met with the FBI, told them stuff about Mr. Rechnitz they weren't even aware of, about his relationship with Mr. Rechnitz that came out at the trial.

No 5K letter was written or entered into, no formal cooperation agreement, but there was clear cooperation in the case. He went and did that because it was the right thing to do, and then against the advice of the lawyer again, without going through communications, he calls up Mr. Taly to meet with him and tells him what he did with, frankly, the understanding that he was very likely going to get tape recorded here. And against the advice of counsel, he went out to do this because he felt he couldn't deal with it. He wanted to try and work it out. He wanted to see if Taly could take over the company, work something out with Falcon, to try and see if it could work out.

This is really who Nissen is. This was not something he was trying to hide. He went in, and he just bared his soul to the U.S. Attorney's Office, and, Judge, he met with the

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trustees. He met with the receivers. He made himself available to the government and to Kroll to try and figure out the losses and what the numbers were. This is a defendant, your Honor, who did everything right in order to try and put his money where his mouth is, to say not only am I remorseful, but I want to try to make it better if I can.

The reason this is so significant, Judge, there was another ticket guy who got indicted in this district and got sentenced by Judge Wood to 78 months in jail named Joseph Meli. Meli's case, your Honor, had a \$60 million fraud. Even though \$106 million of investor money was taken in, the government gave him credit -- I just was reading the sentence memo. government gave him credit for interest payments, actually, that were made, which we did not get in this case. And I'm not saying we're entitled to it, but they did get it for Meli's case. Mr. Meli did nothing to help the government. He actually continued to obfuscate the crimes. Actually, he was someone, Judge, who did nothing right in connection with this investigation. And the reason that's significant is because his defense lawyer moved for a variance, and the government, in distinguishing cases in which the judges gave significant variances, said, Unlike those defendants he did nothing to help us. He didn't go to the SEC and try -- some of those other cases.

So, in other words, the government, your Honor, in

fighting against Meli's motion for a variance, argued that he didn't help us, he didn't go forward. Contrary to the insinuations that Meli had given — that's why it was fair comment, because otherwise, of course, you could never really hold it against a defendant that he didn't cooperate, but he'd insinuated that he was trying to do these right things. So, my argument, Judge, is where a defendant does all of these right things, it seems to me that, even in the government's perspective, certainly that they raised in the Meli case, a defendant should be entitled to, I believe, very significant credit for the remorse and the help and the cooperation he gave. And under U.S. v. Fernandez, even if it doesn't lead to a 5K agreement, as your Honor's aware, you have full authority and right to give Mr. Nissen credit for all the right things he tried to do after this happened.

Judge, I want to talk for two minutes about what NECO was to give you some understanding about the bad judgment that he did. And before I say that I know, I'm happy you understand, your Honor, that I don't think anyone thinks this is a predatory fraud. This was not something where Mr. Nissen went out and his primary or sole motivation was to reap enrichment for himself.

We know, from the *Rivernider* case, that that is a very significant point for a judge to consider. Judge Rakoff has and many, many -- Judge Crotty has, and many other judges have

thought about the fact that, you know, Judge, if I run somebody over with my car by accident or run somebody over with my car because I'm drunk, either way I run somebody over, but the law always looks to why did I run somebody over? What were my motivations? And sometimes the defendant's conduct is different even though the result is the same.

\$71 million was lost by these victims, and we wish we could turn the clock back, because we know this caused harm to people. There's no getting around that, and we're not trying. But at the end of the day, the motivations behind what

Mr. Nissen did were not the type of, as Mr. Zolkind indicated,

Madoff-related greed, to screw everybody he could screw -
excuse me language, your Honor -- in order to try and get that

motivation. The ABA, your Honor, defines a predatory offense
as intended to inflict loss with the sole or dominant purpose
of generating personal gains for the defendant. That's clearly
not what happened here.

Judge, regarding the \$71 million, Mr. Nissen started NECO in 2006. He was 34 years old, I think, back then. Over the time, your Honor, he put his entire life savings of about \$3 million into the company. He took no salary from 2012 to 2015. He loaned the company his own salary. He tried to make this, and did make it, an enormously successful business. Indeed, your Honor, in 2016, after the loans were acquired, the company generated almost \$60 million in sales. This was, even

at the time that Falcon came in, a really profitable, really revenue-generated company. One of the issues, this was all too granular in some ways, was EBITDA versus the actual profits, but there was terrific revenues that were being generated.

Mr. Nissen needed cash to operate. He had taken out these horrible, what would otherwise have been usurious loans, and he couldn't make the payments. And rather than going into bankruptcy -- Mr. Zolkind is right, and maybe he should have done that; not maybe, he should've done that. What he did is he went to Falcon and he borrowed money. 7 million of it was authorized for other payments, but I think it's important for the Court to know that out of the moneys he took from Falcon, a vast majority of it, in fact, did go for business expenses.

Payments clearly went to pay some other investors, but for example, your Honor — this is in my sentencing memo — 4 million out of the money that he got from Falcon, in the closing, in July 2015, was immediately expended just on costs, out of the money got from Falcon. 7 million of the money went to a prior investor. 16 million went to overhead. 2 million was lost in the college football. A million was lost in a minus zero winter festival event. 5 million was lost on the Super Bowl. There were tremendous losses of capital that he got from Falcon. The amounts of money that actually went to pay other investors post—Falcon was probably —— I don't want to guess, but it's certainly less than \$10 million. \$11 million

of the money went to Jona Rechnitz as a finder's fee for Rechnitz, as an expense for getting other people to bring in, to make investments into the company.

The point I'm making is not to justify his conduct, but I think it's important for your Honor to know that this was not the Ponzi scheme where everything from Falcon was shooting out to pay investors. It was going to generate and run the company primarily, but there was money that went out, and money was secured by Falcon through false statements. No one's trying to reduce the charges against that, but as far as the predatory nature of the offense, I think it's appropriately important for the Court to know that, as well as the government, what was going on.

You also should know, your Honor, Falcon was looking at the books and records of this company in a very, very significant way as well, so I think that that's important for the Court to know.

Judge, Mr. Nissen is 47 years old. He has no criminal convictions. He was born and raised in Brooklyn, New York. His parents were both school teachers. His two siblings — one's an attorney and one's a managing director as an insurance company. I'm not going to repeat this here openly in court, but as the memo indicates, let's say he has fairly complicated family relationships. His mom's not here today. His dad is in the hospital, diagnosed with cancer. He's been in the hospital

since April. He has not been out. He has to learn to walk again, etc. Mr. Nissen has revived a bit of that relationship with his dad, who wanted to be here today but he could not. He has no relationship with one sibling and one relationship with the other.

Growing up, he's never had much of a safety net, and he doesn't have much of one now. He's thankful for what he does have from his family, from his parents and his siblings, but it's not much.

Since his arrest, your Honor, he has relied almost exclusively on his wife's love and kindness and on the kindness and generosity of friends. Mr. Nissen's not a lazy guy, Judge. When he couldn't work in this business anymore, he drove an Uber. When the Uber business fired him because of his arrest in this case, he has been spending the last year or so loading trucks at Hunts Point from 1:00 in the morning until 3:00 in the afternoon so that he could then come home and take care of his children while his wife was often at work during the day. That's what he's been doing, for minimum wage, because that's the kind of person he is. He has obligations financially to his family, and he has, since he's been a kid, been a hard, honest worker. That's who Jason is. He was never — is not now and was not then — a lazy thief looking for quick money.

When he was in high school, he had enormous athletic distinction, including academic ones, where he won math awards,

science awards, all detailed in our memorandum. He has always been, since a kid, philanthropic. When he was an Eagle Scout, he literally was, proverbially and literally, the boy scout. He ran a food bank, essentially, for 700 senior citizens, where he managed that as an Eagle Scout. Letters from his college friends and football friends — when the sentence was originally set, about a year ago, Judge, we had about 50 of his fraternity brothers and other friends, people who know him and who deal with him, talk about him, ready to come on to court. Many of them could not reschedule flights today, but they've all written letters and many of them still are here today.

Judge, I know you've read this -- I don't want to belabor the record, but I think indicative of the relationship that people think of him comes from his football coach in college, who wrote:

"Jason's most appealing characteristic was ability to strive to improve. He was always asking how can I get better. He would quickly raise -- quickly rise to be one of our team leader's. He gained the team's respect by what he did, on and off the field, and the intensity that he did it. He was always there to help a coach with the recruiting of a new prospect or to help his teammates with a math class. He was truly a person who valued his community and his teammates."

And he's continued to do that. He was active with underprivileged children and remained active with

underprivileged children. He sponsored tournaments in basketball and softball, and still does. He tutored kids in math for free in underprivileged areas. After he graduated college, he didn't run away with his math degree and his math ring to get an MBA and work on Wall Street. Nothing wrong with that, but that's not what he did. He became a schoolteacher, where he again taught math. He then, Judge, tutored kids for free on their SATs, and one woman wrote a letter to the Court about the impact he had on that.

During NECO and since, your Honor, he's coached the boys' and girls' softball teams at Frank Sinatra School of Arts. He provides math tutoring to underprivileged kids at PS-292 in East New York. He volunteered for the NBA Junior Nets program, sponsored by the NBA, to help underprivileged kids. He's sponsored leagues and tournaments: In 2013, the Fab 48 Basketball tournament for youths; the New York Urban Professional League in Harlem; the Tip of the Hat Tournament in New York City in 2016, after this case had already become, come around; 2013 to '17, Chicago Mustangs basketball team to attend tournaments for, again, underprivileged kids.

Gary DeCesare, your Honor, who is a high school administrator in Chicago, who's known Jason for nine years, wrote a letter to the Court about how Jason has been in his community in Chicago to "mentor our young men" and continues "to help low-income students to attend private school." That's

what Jason does. That is the kind of person he is.

There's letters, your Honor:

Christine Liu, a lawyer and former assistant chief counsel for the Department of Homeland Security, who wrote a letter to the Court about Jason's dedication to the Albertson Herricks Little League and how he's dedicated there -- his daughter plays there -- to help the team;

Deven Shah, who's a senior information risk officer at Bank of New York-Mellon, talks about Jason's kindness;

Norvin Lee, deputy assistant commissioner for DCAS, administration-police unit and the Albertson Herricks Little League, talks about his dedication to children;

Kevin Cloutier, who's known Jason forever, who is now a partner in a major law firm, talks about his kindness and he is the epitome, would give anything, take the shirt off his back for anybody;

Geoffrey Engler, an affordable housing developer working in Massachusetts, writes about the kindness that Jason has always extended; and on and on and on, Judge.

And perhaps somewhat moving is also an individual, your Honor, who is someone in his family who got very, very sick. Jason was there. Jason got doctors together. That's the guy he is. That's the guy he is, someone who, by and large, your Honor, on the scales of justice, this is the bad stuff and this is the good stuff. Just a fact, Judge.

Now, your Honor, the saddest part of any criminal sentencing is the horrible impact it has on families. Whether it's Mr. Nissen or anybody else who appears in front of you, if there's families and children, they're impacted when dad or mom has to go to jail, and Mr. Nissen knows that and he lives with it daily and cries about it all the time, but he knows it's his fault and he has to now deal with those impacts.

The question for your Honor, I respectfully urge, even before the old days, Booker, when you had the extraordinary circumstances you had to show, even then, under that very high standard, the courts recognized the purpose of a sentencing court was never, ever to inadvertently, as a condition or part of the sentence, wreak havoc quote/unquote on the family unit. And that's unfortunately what's going to happen. Regardless of what your Honor does, there's going to be wreaking of some havoc, and sorry to say it to Mr. Nissen, but that's his fault.

The issue, though, is how much havoc has to be wreaked before the parsimony clause says it's enough? How much damage has to be done, which are going to be collateral consequences of his own behavior?

Haydee's here in court today. She's about eight months' pregnant. I think she's due in about 20 days. He's got a daughter with Haydee, Elisabeth. We've indicated to the Court in our sentencing memorandum some of the serious issues that she's going through at the age of three years old, about

three, the cognitive issues, etc., without having to go through that in open court. Jason is one of the few remarkable guys who's actually still very close with his first wife, Deana, who wrote a letter to the Court about the type of terrific person Jason is and the outstanding dad he is to their daughter Ava, who is 11 years old. I was going to read her letter, but I don't think I could do it, frankly, without tearing up. This is the situation that Mr. Nissen finds himself in, trying to save his family, knowing that he has to get punished for what he's done, and that's one of the reasons, your Honor, that I opened up my remarks by saying that I wouldn't trade my job for yours for anything.

Judge, Dr. Silver -- we thought it was important to have a clinical perspective of this. He's indicated in his report what he thinks the impact of any sentence, but certainly a long sentence, would be. And Judge, we know that when children are removed from their parents, which unfortunately has happened in some political environments, that there is post-stress syndrome that evokes from that.

Jason is very, very close and very intertwined in the lives of his children. Whenever — he's always with them when he's not working. Ava adores him. Ava and Elisabeth live close to each other. Haydee and Deana try to maintain a relationship with each other, and the concern is, once Jason's gone, how that's going to work its way out. Ava and Elisabeth

not are only half-sisters, they're just like sisters to each other. And Elisabeth, they're just enormously concerned. And Judge, you're a dad, I'm a dad. We all know the impact of the actions when we take — when we have to leave for a short — parents who go to war, come back in a year, the impact on children. When you're talking about the types of numbers that the guidelines talk about here, it's just kind of mind-boggling.

So, Judge, talking about what's the right type of sentence to impose, the guideline numbers -- again, Judge Rakoff and many other judges have called them -- Judge Gleeson, etc. -- call them kind of the arithmetical madness that results from these numbers. You know what, Judge, what's weird, if you look at 1987 -- I put this in my memo. In 1987, Mr. Nissen's offense level would have called for a sentence of somewhere in the 30-month range for his conduct, the loss \$5 million and up.

Judge, what I did is I took the value of \$5 million and up and said what is \$5 million then worth today? \$5 million then is worth about \$11-1/2 million in today's money. If you look at what the guidelines are for \$11-1/2 million, it's almost 70 months. So, just taking the base numbers and just extrapolating to our numbers, we have tripled the amount of jail time that what we thought was good in '87 to what we think is good now, for no empirical reason. None.

And Judge, you know it from all the memos you've read,

there is no science behind it. It is purely, respectfully, as the literature shows, a reaction to address the public saying you've got to put more people in jail, for some reason, where Congress felt they had to react. There is really no science behind it; we just tripled the amount of time. And indeed, if you looked at the amount of gain that Mr. Nissen made from the offense and you weren't looking at the loss number, at an \$800,000 gain, you're probably looking at somewhere in the three-year range as well.

At the end of the day, Judge, for some reason our guidelines now are talking about warehousing a 47-year-old man essentially until he's 57 or 55 for a very serious crime, admittedly, but ignoring, respectfully, all of these other very serious factors. And I can see why so many judges in this district — and this district is the most creative district in the country for imposing sentences below the guidelines range, because, frankly, I think judges, many of them, and I don't mean to impute some, respectfully, I think that there's an understanding that human life means something and that punishment means something, but a guy like Jason Nissen can be doing a lot more out sooner than in longer. And a guy like Jason Nissen and Elisabeth and Ava and his wife, there's a serious amount of pain they have to suffer, but again, Judge, not to be redundant, how much is enough?

That is, your Honor, for you to determine.

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Finally, Judge, as far as disparity issues are concerned in sentencing, we've given the Court a whole bunch of cases, and I know you know those cases and you've read those cases, where defendants have committed crimes, some less serious, some much more serious, where courts have given very, very, very significant variances to defendants based upon their view of the arithmetic craziness of the numbers and a whole lot of other reasons.

Your Honor, I understand that one of the purposes of sentencing is to send a message. It's an important thing to do, general deterrence we lawyers call it. You've got to send the message out to society you can't do this stuff without suffering for it. Statistically and empirically, and it's all in the memo, we all know that short and definite sentences have a greater impact, actually, than long sentences down the road on white collar defendants. They just do. There's no need, Judge -- a white collar offender is not going to say, Let me see, if I get three years that's a good one; if I get nine years that's a bad one. White collar offenders -- and many other offenders may think that. Anyway, Judge, the analysis is on white collar offenders. They know that even sentences of probation have drastic, drastic deterrent impacts of defendants, and I'm not suggesting that that's what's happening here, but they all know that.

Judge, it all comes back to the parsimony clause

again. Your Honor, we defer to your judgment, your experience and your view of all these facts to come up with a fair number and a reasonable number that is the lowest number that meets the goals of sentencing, taking into consideration his cooperation, his clean record, his charitable events, which in and of themselves deserve a variance. And all of those other factors and, most remarkably, the family unit that we argue deserves serious, serious consideration by your Honor.

Thank you so much, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Bachner.

Mr. Nissen, do you wish to make a statement?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Just kindly speak into the microphone.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

THE DEFENDANT: I have mixed emotions as I stand before this Court. On the one hand, I am very scared. Growing up and leading the life that I have had, I never thought I would do something so very wrong and facing a sentence before a judge.

But I have also been looking forward to today because I have wanted for a long time, since I was arrested, to tell certain people how sorry I am for my actions, how sad I am because of what I have done to good people, and how remorseful I am for my actions.

Somehow I lost my way in trying to keep my company afloat. NECO to me was like a child I reared and nurtured. I was so excited about building the business and being a success. It was a real business, a growing business. In my mind I felt like I could not abandon it when we suffered certain losses. I always believed things would work out and no harm would be done to anyone. I never intended for anyone to lose any money.

But my conduct was wrong. There is no real excuse for what I did. I just want people to understand what I was thinking.

My illegal conduct is something I will live with for the rest of my life. I have already apologized to Falcon and to other victims of my conduct, and to those I have not apologized to personally, I do so now. I quickly pled guilty. I self-reported my crime. I have given my full cooperation to help recover any funds that could and should be recovered. I express my sincere remorse to Falcon, Hutton, Taly, EGC and TickPick for their losses and hardships I have caused, and I promise to work hard to make restitution to all of you.

As I rehabilitate myself, I hope to become an upstanding member of my community and society and that I will also earn your forgiveness.

I also want to apologize to my family and friends. It is often the loved ones of the people who commit a crime that pay the highest price, and it is no different in my case. My

wife, who is eight months' pregnant, and my two young children, Ava and Elisabeth, have suffered and will suffer more than I can describe because of what I did. Mr. Bachner has discussed in our report the serious family issues I have and the horrible impact my sentencing will have on Haydee and our kids. I know this is all of my fault, but still I must beg of your Honor to please consider and show me some mercy, for their sakes only.

Not only have I caused pain to the victims of my crime and to my wife and children, but I have hurt my parents, who raised me to know right from wrong. I feel tremendous shame.

I don't know what the future has in store for me, but the one thing I can say with certainty is that I will never do anything like this again. Before my conduct in this case, I lived an honorable life. I am basically a good person, but I did wrong and understand I will be punished. I ask this Court for mercy on behalf of my family, not for me.

I thank the Court for the time it has given me to speak today.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Bachner.

Counsel, we're going to take a five-minute recess for everyone's comfort and while I collect my thoughts.

(Recess)

THE COURT: Be seated, everyone.

Is there any reason why sentence should not now be imposed?

MR. ZOLKIND: No, your Honor.

MR. BACHNER: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Let me begin, before I set out my sentencing remarks, just by thanking all counsel both for your really helpful written submissions in advance of sentencing but also your very thoughtful and helpful oral submissions today. And I particularly want to thank counsel for spending a great deal of time with the process of reconstructing the money trail here, which turned out to be important but obviously imposed a burden on counsel beyond that which occurs in the usual case. It was of considerable assistance to me in helping me figure out the just outcome here, so I'm grateful to all here.

As I have stated, the guideline range applicable to this case is 97 to 121 months' imprisonment.

Under the Supreme Court's decision in *Booker*, and the cases that have followed it, the guidelines range is only one factor that the Court must consider in deciding the appropriate sentence. The Court is also required to consider the other factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). These include:

The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;

The need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law; and to provide just punishment for the offense; to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; to protect the public from

further crimes of the defendant; and to provide the defendant with needed education or vocational training, medical care or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;

The kinds of sentences available;

The guidelines range;

Any pertinent policy statement;

The need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and

The need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.

The Court is also required to impose a sentence sufficient but no greater than necessary to comply with the purposes set out above.

I find that the sentence I am about to pronounce is sufficient but not greater than necessary to satisfy the purposes of sentencing I have just mentioned.

Mr. Nissen, imposing sentence is always difficult.

But I have found your case to be a particularly difficult and tragic one. I reflected on your case in the lead-up to the initial sentencing hearing last year. It has been on my mind in the nearly one year in between then and now while Kroll did its work. And in the past several weeks, as this day has approached, I have given a great deal of thought and attention to the appropriate sentence in this case, in general and

specifically in light of the Section 3553(a) factors that guide a court in sentencing, and the appropriate purposes of sentencing.

It is safe to say there are factors that point strongly towards quite a long sentence, and there are factors that point strongly in the other direction. I have carefully reviewed the parties' submissions, the two victim impact statements I have received, and the letters I received on your behalf from your family and friends, the people who know you best. The following are my thoughts.

Forgive me at the outset for going on at some length, but this is a complex case, and explaining the sentence I have determined to be just and reasonable takes some time.

Under Section 3553(a), one set of factors a court must consider is the seriousness of the offense and the need for just punishment and the need for the sentence to promote respect for the law. Of the various 3553(a) factors, these factors are the ones that point most strongly towards a long sentence.

To put it simply, as Mr. Zolkind said, you perpetrated a fraud on a massive scale. The fraud cost your lenders more than \$71 million. And make no mistake, the crime here did not consist of a failure to repay a loan. That, without more, would not have been a crime. The crime here involved obtaining those loans on false pretenses. That's what made it a fraud.

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There were various false pretenses, but your core false pretense in your representations to potential lenders was that the money you were obtaining would almost all be put towards future business; that is, the purchase of ticket inventory and That was false. In fact, as you well knew, the the like. money was going to be used to repay old debtors to a degree far greater than you disclosed. You knew the loan proceeds would be used in this fashion, but to get the loans you falsely pretended otherwise. And that's, in fact, what happened. Money that lenders thought was going to be applied towards future business was used to pay back old debts that you were otherwise unable to repay. In effect, although your underlying ticket business was legitimate, your conduct as it related to financing that business became a Ponzi scheme in which new money, styled as investments, went to pay back old debts.

And along the way, to keep the fraud going and to avoid discovery, you made collateral lies to dupe your lenders. You forged documents. You changed the balance on a bank statement via Photoshop. You fabricated accounts receivable numbers of the ticket company that were being reported to lenders. You transferred funds among accounts to give the illusion of financial solvency. In all these ways, you camouflaged the true state of the company's finances and you perpetrated the fraud. This took time and effort and forethought. The fact that your crime continued over time and

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was not a one-time event and necessarily involved a series of deliberate actions to con your lenders and avoid detection makes it more serious.

The crime is also serious because of the consequences. The effect of the crime was to rip off a number of lenders --Falcon Strategic Partners, Taly USA Holdings and an affiliate, Hutton Ventures, TickPick LLC and Dean Landis and related The fact that the victim companies are corporate entities does not mitigate the crime. Corporate victims have rights too. And as the victim impact letters I have received reflect, and Mr. Zolkind made the point well, behind those corporate entities are real people with real lives whom your scheme badly harmed. The letter from the representative of one victim described the damage that you did by looting that The letter stated that your crime ate up the savings company. of innocent individuals who had stakes in that company and depended on its solvency. Your crime, that victim stated, devastated people who were counting on their company to provide for their retirements and for their children's educations. other words, the damage you did here was anything but abstract. Real people were hurt, indirectly but predictably, by the \$71 million fraud you directed to the lending companies.

You and Mr. Bachner, to your credit, have not blamed the victims here, but I nevertheless want to be very clear. To the extent there could be any suggestion that these companies

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assumed the risk your criminal conduct presented, I reject that claim completely. The victim companies were in the lending business, and they assumed the risk of losing all their money. Any company that lends money to a company in the ticket-reselling business is taking a large risk that they will not get their money back. Lending to a ticket-reselling company is playing with fire. It's not like lending money to General Electric or IBM. And the high interest rates that your company was obligated to pay the lenders make clear that the lenders perceived a big risk. But your lenders had rights too, and chief among them was to be told the truth. They did not take the risk of getting defrauded by their debtor. the right to rely, before parting with their money, on the truthfulness of your representations as to where the money was headed.

And their rights were not only at the outset of the lending relationship. During the time period that the loans remained outstanding, your lenders had the right to rely on your representations as to where the loaned money had gone and what the ticket company's financial condition then and there was. Had the lenders who had fronted your company money known earlier in time that your company was in desperate straits and overextended and effectively on life support, they could have acted then to protect their interests. But your lies to them, over time, lulled them into inaction. Your lies deprived them

of the ability to act to protect their interests until it was too late.

Mr. Nissen, I appreciate that you, through your counsel, have criticized one of the lenders for accusing you in its letter of absconding with \$10 million of the proceeds for later use on a Caribbean island, or something of that nature. I am persuaded that that was an inaccurate accusation. Ultimately, its falsity was exposed by Kroll's work, but the bottom line is that Taly and Falcon and the three other lenders whose money you diverted to pay your preexisting debts are victims here. I completely understand the victims' outrage at being looted of millions of dollars. I can understand how a victim of a fraud of this scale might jump to the conclusion that the perpetrator of a fraud of this scale had stashed money away somewhere. It just so happens, though, as Kroll has shown, that that isn't the case.

The bottom line is this. Under Section 3553(a), the \$71 million fraud here, perpetrated by a long-running series of lies, makes this crime extremely serious. Section 3553(a) requires a sentence to reflect just punishment, and the gravity, duration and means and methods of the crime together mean that there is simply some level below which a sentence simply cannot go lest it not reflect just punishment.

And so, victims of the crime here, to the extent you are here, and I think that's just one, but victims as well who

will read this transcript later, please know that the sentence I impose today will respect and reflect the wrong that was done to you, and I will put in place a restitution order reflecting the debt that Mr. Nissen owes each of you from the scheme. I will make it a condition of the maximum term of supervised release that will follow Mr. Nissen's incarceration that he make payments towards that restitution order. And more than that, I expect that to the extent restitution is unpaid at the end of the supervised release term, the restitution order, by my hand, will be converted to a civil judgment against Mr. Nissen. The victims can then use that order to assure Mr. Nissen's continued payment towards restitution in the many years and, if necessary, decades, to come.

Before leaving this first set of Section 3553(a) factors, I do want to comment on the motive for this crime, because that is important context.

As a judge in this court, I see many cases involving financial fraud. The vast majority of defendants sentenced for such crimes were motivated by personal greed. I'm referring to cases involving insider trading schemes, boiler room schemes, telemarketing schemes, corporate schemes to phony up earnings reports and other financial metrics and any number of other schemes and scams prosecuted as mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud or securities fraud. The goal of these frauds is almost always personal enrichment, and the fruits of those frauds are

often opulent real estate and swollen bank accounts and driveways full of luxury cars and extravagant resort travel and shopping sprees and the like. I have seen many of those cases, years ago, as a prosecutor and, in more recent years, as a judge.

This is not such a case, or even remotely close.

You have written in your letter to me, and you have consistently said, Mr. Nissen, that your goal in seeking the loans here by illegal means was to keep your company alive.

The record, as developed by Kroll, under the supervision of government counsel over the last year, makes clear that that is so.

Of course, your desire to keep NECO alive did not justify breaking the law and lying to lenders. The responsible course for you was instead to tell the truth to the lenders. Your responsibility was to accurately portray the company's finances and to let the chips fall where they might; if your company went bust, if a lender forced you into bankruptcy, with all the hard consequences that meant for you and your employees and all the shame you might have felt, so be it. You had no right to dupe lenders because you weren't willing to face up to the company's inability to pay its debts. You had no right to take liberties like that with other people's money or to put your company's survival over the rights of your lenders.

But the fact that your motivation was to save the

company and not to line your pockets is important in my assessment of the just punishment. The crime would be much worse and much more predatory and despicable had it been committed out of personal greed. I am persuaded that this crime had its roots in your unwillingness to face reality. You were unable to acknowledge that your company, after a series of financial reversals, could not pay its debts and was on the brink of collapse. In the crucible, you panicked and you made a terrible decision, one with whose consequences you will live for the rest of your life. Instead of owning the problem and taking responsibility, you shifted responsibility to your creditors, whom you misled. And while that kept the company going somewhat longer, it only deepened the hole you were in and it only deferred the reckoning. That's why we're here today.

I asked that the Kroll investigation be done because it was important for me to determine empirically what your motivation had been, and the Kroll investigation almost entirely bears out your version of events. It shows that almost all of the money obtained from lenders was used to keep your company afloat by paying its debts.

Now, the record is not perfect in this respect. A subset of the funds obtained by NECO were used to pay personal expenses of yours. These included money paid towards the purchase of your home and alimony to your ex-wife and payment

of Haydee Nissen's credit card expenses and gambling losses.

And so it isn't literally the case that there was no direct personal benefit whatsoever. There was some, and that is an unfortunate fact for you. That fact is today's sentence.

But the big picture revealed by Kroll's work is that this crime was fundamentally a misbegotten effort to save the company, and as Mr. Bachner points out, had you been driven by personal enrichment as opposed to trying to keep the company alive, you would have taken for yourself, and not kept in the company, the hundreds of thousands of dollars in uncashed distribution checks to which you were entitled.

Bottom line, while your crime inflicted great harm, your motive was far more situational than in most cases of comparable sized fraud. Most cases generating guidelines like yours involve perpetrators whose motives are more malignant.

That ends my discussion of the first set of 3553(a) factors, meaning the need for just punishment and the like.

Under Section 3553(a), I am to consider next the interest in what is called general deterrence. That refers to the need for the sentence I impose to be sufficient to discourage other people who would consider committing a financial fraud like yours from doing so. There is a very strong interest in that here. There are far too many cases involving business fraud in our criminal justice system. It's important that the sentences imposed in these cases, considered

in the aggregate, be sufficient to convey to people who consider crossing such a line that, if they get caught, there will be life-changing consequences.

As the government points out, the interest in a sentence that will serve as a general deterrent is particularly acute in the area of white collar crime. That is so for a number of reasons. There tend to be fewer prosecutions in that area; the cases of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt can be harder to build in that area; the prosecutions and sentences in cases in that area tend to get outsized attention; and people in white collar lines of work tend to hear about sentences imposed on white collar perpetrators, like you, of financial frauds. So, the premise of general deterrence has special traction in the area of business crimes like yours.

At the same time, while the interest in general deterrence favors a meaningful prison sentence, it does not guide a court more specifically than that. There has been a lot of scholarship in the area of general deterrence. It pretty universally shows that when it comes to deterring other people from committing crimes, it is primarily the speed and likelihood of getting caught and convicted that is the most powerful general deterrent. Provided that there is some meaningful sentence, the scholarship does not suggest that the length of the sentence contributes much at all to general deterrence. Beyond a certain point, an incrementally longer

sentence does not yield incrementally greater general deterrence of other people, so the factor of general deterrence favors a meaningful prison sentence, but not one of any particular length. It certainly doesn't require anything remotely close to a sentence within the guideline range here.

Under Section 3553(a), I am also to consider the interest in specific deterrence. That refers to the need for the sentence I impose to send a message that is sufficient to deter you from committing a future crime, Mr. Nissen. That factor, in my judgment, is not insignificant in your case. This was your first offense. You have had a completely spotless criminal record. In fact, outside of this offense, you appear to have led a thoroughly upstanding life, with a strong record of gainful employment, industry and civil engagement, and this offense was self-evidently the product of particular circumstances. Your company was up against it, and you made a terrible choice. You succumbed to the temptation to try to patch your company through by seeking out loans on false pretenses.

But there is nothing in your history or the record of this case that would lead a person to think that you will recidivate. There is nothing that suggests that you are prone generally to taking advantage of others. Everything I have read about you is to the contrary.

It's also clear to me that you are in agony as a

result of being disgraced, of being prosecuted, of facing a term in federal prison, and of subjecting your wife and the children, who you adore, to financial hardship and separation from you. I have no doubt, none whatsoever, that if you are ever tempted to commit a crime again, the searing pain of the past several years would stay your hand, and so, insofar as the 3553(a) factor of specific deterrence is concerned, a long prison sentence is not needed here. Coupled with all the other adverse effects upon you of the exposure of your fraud, a prison sentence of almost any length should get your attention and deter you from committing another crime.

In this respect as well, Mr. Nissen, your situation is different from many fraud defendants with guidelines ranges like yours. In many of those cases, the defendant's conduct and history is one good reason to fear that he may strike again.

Under Section 3553(a), I also have to consider the interest in protecting the public, otherwise known as incapacitation. That refers to the benefit that the public gets when a person who is prone to commit further crimes is put in federal prison, where, by definition, they cannot injure the free public. For much the same reasons as I covered just now in discussing specific deterrence, that is also not a consequential factor here. I do not believe you are a risk to the public.

The public has little to fear from you, Mr. Nissen, if you are at large. Until this crime, you were very much a positive contributor to your various communities. Unlike many of the violent criminals or drug dealers or serial thieves or fraud perpetrators whom I have occasion all too much occasion to sentence, you do not have any demonstrated proclivity to commit crimes. There are other reasons a meaningful prison sentence is required here, primarily just punishment and to some degree general deterrence. The protection of the public is not one of them. In this respect as well, your case is quite different from the heartland of cases to which the fraud guidelines apply.

So far I have reviewed the factors under Section 3553(a) that, in many cases, tend favor a longer period of incarceration, although in your case, only some of them do. I now want to turn to two other 3553(a) factors, two other factors that favor you. To begin with, you accepted responsibility. You did that, first and foremost, by pleading guilty. In so doing, you acknowledged that you had done wrong, and you spared the Justice Department and the federal courts the resources that otherwise would have been consumed in litigating your guilt. That matters to the Court, as it does under the sentencing guidelines. Please know that had you not pled guilty, had your guilt been established instead at a trial that had facts that were substantially the same, the sentence

you would have received would have been a good deal higher.

In your case, there is added significance to your acceptance of responsibility because of the exceptional circumstances surrounding it and the exceptional nature of the steps you took. Ordinarily, a defendant who gets credit for accepting responsibility is indicted, and then sometime later, after receiving discovery and while on a pretrial schedule, agrees to plead guilty and admits guilt. In your case, in contrast, you confessed to your victims and you walked the case into the U.S. Attorney's Office. You admitted your guilt, and from there it was just a matter of negotiating the details of the plea.

Now, I understand that credit for that wise decision is due, in part, to your counsel, and I also understand that the circumstances left you with limited viable options.

Circumstances, as the government rightly points out, had spiraled well out of your control. You were unable to pay your creditors. You had been confronted by them. You had confessed to some of them, and it was clear to all that you had brazenly lied to them to get their money. It was a matter of time before your creditors would have reported the fraud presumably to the Justice Department, and it was a matter of time before you were charged and apprehended.

Nevertheless, with the benefit of eight years on the bench, I can say that your decision to self-report your fraud

was extraordinary. I've seen many defendants who, by any objective measure, are dead to rights. The evidence of their guilt is increasingly overwhelming. They, however, do not self-report, and they often enter pleas of guilty long after indictment. You deserve more credit for owning your guilt and admitting it early and unequivocally. Again, you saved the system substantial resources that could presumptively put to use in other matters. In the same vein, you have worked with your lenders and the bankruptcy trustee to reconstruct events. All of that may help your victims gain a degree of relief. Certainly it has helped counsel and the Court formulate restitution and forfeiture orders, whose terms you properly do not dispute.

I also accept that you are remorseful for your crimes. I've read your lengthy letter to me. I've heard your remarks today. It's clear to me that you appreciate the steep price that your family is paying and will continue to pay for your decision to defraud your lenders. I appreciate that you've expressed remorse for the harm you visited upon your lenders, who did not deserve what they got.

Apart from your acceptance of responsibility, as Mr. Bachner points out, I am required, under Section 3553(a), a court to consider the defendant's history and characteristics, and at this point in the analysis, I am focused on the aspects of your life and character independent of the crime for which

you are about to be sentenced. In assessing that, I have been benefitted by an excellent and perceptive presentence report but also by the very insightful sentencing submission I received from Mr. Bachner and from the many letters attached to it.

From the many letters I have received about you, it is clear to me that this offense, while gravely wrong, is also completely anomalous in your life's experience. You present from those letters as a person with a profound work ethic, going back to your teens; as a devoted son and brother and father and husband; as a girls' softball coach who has taken an outsized interest in the well-being of the children on his team and their families; and as an employer with a laudable degree of commitment to his employees, albeit that may have led you to stray here.

It is also clear to me that as a result of the central role you play in the lives of many people, including your wife and daughters and even your ex-wife, your absence will hit others hard. It's also clear to me, as we heard this morning, that certain people in your extended family who are positioned to step up to fill the void that you will leave upon your incarceration, particularly in the life of your younger daughter, have not done so. That saddens me. In the interest of your daughter, who has done nothing wrong and should not be shunned on account of her father's misdeeds, I certainly hope

that her relatives and others will rally around her.

I've read carefully all the letters I received on your behalf, as I did the victim impact letters. I was going to read aloud extensive excerpts from the letters. I'm not going to do that, because Mr. Bachner has essentially all but done that for me, and while there is more that I could capture in the letters, I think his summary substantially captured the central ingredients.

Let me just ask, by a show of hands, who here wrote letters to me.

All right. Please know that I read in detail all of those letters, and I appreciate those of you who participated in this proceeding by writing about Mr. Nissen. Your insights and your accounts of his good works absolutely made a difference in my assessment of his history and characteristics, and I thank you for participating as you did.

These letters are all impressive testimonials. On the day that a person is sentenced, it is appropriate that they be evaluated in light of the totality of their life's experience, the good as well as the bad. I will do so today, Mr. Nissen. Please know the letters I have received about you from your family and your many friends have assisted me in my reflections as to the just sentence.

In the end, my judgment here is that while a real and meaningful term of imprisonment is necessary as a matter of

necessary and just punishment, the guidelines recommendation of a term of between 97 and 121 months' imprisonment is not only excessive but obviously excessive. The Court's obligation under the law is not to be a slave to the guidelines, and the judges in this district recognize that. In over half the cases in this district, courts vary below the guidelines range, often markedly, and under the parsimony principle repeatedly articulated by the Second Circuit, it is not merely to impose some reasonable sentence; it is to impose the lowest reasonable sentence viewed in light of the 3353(a) factors.

Here, while an eight- to ten-year sentence could certainly be viewed in some sense as among the reasonable sentencing options, the 3553(a) factors make sentences materially below that guideline range eminently reasonable too, and again, under the parsimony principle, the lower of the reasonable sentences as a matter of law is to control.

The guideline range here is driven almost entirely by the dollar amount of the fraud, but the guidelines do not take into account the factors that distinguish your case from others' with similar ranges. Most of all, as I've said a couple times, those cases, the defendant presents almost always a real risk of recidivism, such that the factors of protection of the public and specific deterrence require a prison term of greater length.

Not so here. For the reasons I have stated, in your

case, the risk of recidivism is not a serious concern. Your life's experience involves an admirable amount of good works, and I do not perceive any risk to the public presented by your being at liberty. On the contrary, it is clear to the Court that once you have served your time for this crime, society will be better off with you in it as a free man, doing good and helping pay down the judgments against you. Your life's experience tells me that a free society is better off with you in it than behind bars.

I will, accordingly, impose a prison sentence that reflects a substantial downward variance to the guideline range. To the extent, however, that the defense at any point might have envisioned a noncustodial sentence or a sentence so short as to permit Mr. Nissen to be released in time for certain milestones within his family, I regret that any such request is also unrealistic, and Mr. Bachner, of course, today acknowledged the need for a prison sentence. This was a vast fraud, and as a matter of just punishment, as I said at the outset, and I will conclude with this, there are limits below which a court cannot responsibly go lest to trivialize the offense.

Mr. Nissen, since the time your loan scheme ran aground, you have done all a person can do to accept responsibility and to begin to make amends, but as a matter of justice, as a matter of just punishment that fits the crime,

there is a price you must pay, with your liberty, for that offense. The variance from the guidelines here will, therefore, still result in a consequential term of imprisonment that I'm convinced no one would rationally choose.

I have given long and hard thought to the sentence here. Here, I hope it's obvious that the sentence I'm about to impose is the lowest one, after considered thought, that I believe to be responsibly and reasonably imposed consistent with the Section 3553(a) factors, including the sentencing guidelines.

I'm now going to formally state the sentence I intend to impose. The attorneys will have a final opportunity to make legal objections before the sentence is finally imposed.

Mr. Nissen, would you please rise.

After assessing the particular facts of this case and the factors under Section 3553(a), including the sentencing guidelines, it is the judgment of the Court that you are to serve a sentence of 27 months' imprisonment in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons to be followed by a period of three years of supervised release.

As to the supervised release, the standard conditions of supervised release shall apply.

In addition, you will be subject to the following mandatory conditions:

You shall not commit another federal, state or local

crime.

You shall not illegally possess a controlled substance.

You shall not possess a firearm or destructive device.

You must cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer.

You must notify the Court of any material change in your economic circumstances that might affect your ability to pay restitution, forfeiture or special assessments.

You must also meet the special conditions that are set out on page 32 of the presentence report.

You must provide the probation officer with access to any requested financial information. You must not incur new credit charges or open additional lines of credit without the approval of the probation officer unless you are in compliance with the installment payment schedule that will be set in connection with restitution.

I'm also going to make the payment of restitution, of course, a condition of supervised release.

As to restitution, I find that the victims have suffered monetary losses compensable under the victim protection act in the amount set out in the order of restitution that the government has provided, to wit, \$71,678,669.90.

I, however, will give the government two weeks to

provide me with a revised restitution order that is consistent not just with the dollar amounts that are set out in the draft order but with the proposal on pages 32 to 33 of the presentence report with respect to, among other things, the payment of 15 percent of gross monthly income towards the satisfaction of restitution.

With respect to a fine, I'm not going to impose a fine. I am concerned that if I did so, it would interfere with your restitution payments that simply have to take priority.

With respect to the special assessment, I am imposing a mandatory special assessment of \$100, which shall be due immediately.

Finally, with respect to forfeiture, I'm going to execute the consent forfeiture order that all parties have given me.

Does either counsel know of any legal reason why the sentence shall not be imposed as stated?

MR. ZOLKIND: No, your Honor.

MR. BACHNER: No, Judge.

THE COURT: The sentence is imposed as stated.

Counsel, are there any open counts?

MR. ZOLKIND: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Nissen, to the extent you have not given up your right to appeal your conviction and your sentence through your

plea of guilty and the plea agreement you entered into with the government in connection with that plea, you have a right to appeal those things, your conviction and your sentence. If you're unable to pay for the cost of an appeal, you may apply for leave to appeal *in forma pauperis*. The notice of appeal must be filed within 14 days of the judgment of conviction.

Government, I take it you are comfortable with the defendant's voluntary surrender.

MR. ZOLKIND: We are, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Bachner, two things.

First of all, do you want me to make a recommendation to the Bureau of Prisons with respect to the institution in which he would serve his sentence?

MR. BACHNER: Yes, Judge. In order to facilitate visits and for religious reasons, Otisville would be a wonderful recommendation, if you could.

THE COURT: I take it if Otisville is unavailable, you'd want as a backup recommendation as close as possible to the New York area.

MR. BACHNER: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. What about the surrender date?

MR. BACHNER: Your Honor, given the birth of the child that's expected in about a month, if we could do the first week of November, that would be great. I know it's a little bit longer than normal, Judge, but that would be wonderful.

THE COURT: Any objection from the government?

MR. ZOLKIND: No objection.

THE COURT: Mr. Smallman, a date in the first week of November.

I'm going to direct that Mr. Nissen surrender for service at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons by 2 p.m. on November the 7th, or as notified by pretrial services or the probation department. If for some reason an institution has not been designated, Mr. Nissen, you are to surrender to the U.S. Marshals in this district on that date and time unless the Court, in advance, has deferred the surrender date.

Mr. Nissen, your conditions of release continue up until the time that you report to begin your sentence. If you fail to report for your sentence, you may be charged with another criminal offense. Again, if you don't receive notice of the designated facility to which you're about to surrender, you need to surrender to the U.S. Marshals by the date and time I've given you.

Anything further from the government?

MR. ZOLKIND: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything further from the defense?

MR. BACHNER: No, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Nissen, I just want to conclude by wishing you well. You made a terrible criminal mistake. You

also demonstrated another aspect of your life, real civic commitment, real commitment, to your friends and family. I have little doubt that you have gotten the message from this experience, but I do expect, consistent with what I learned about you, that while you are in prison and afterwards, you will be working overtime to repay the restitution debt and to comport yourself in a way consistent with the expectations that your friends and family and the Court have for you.

You may be seated.

With respect to the friends and family that are here, again, I want to thank you, first of all, for writing me, to the extent that you did, but I also want to thank all of you for being here today. Mr. Nissen has a hard road ahead of him. He will be at one point returning to free society, and he will need your support to help him rebuild his life and put himself in a position where he can once again earn money to help repay the victims. The fact that you're here today tells me you're in his corner for the long term, and that's encouraging to me. It gives me confidence that you will steer him right for the rest of the way.

We stand adjourned.

(Adjourned)